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You shall impose the penalty of death if you find that aggravating circumstances in
this case outweigh any mitigating circumstances.1
Although there is great variation among states, 2 the factfinder in death
penalty cases is typically faced with the task of weighing aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. Death is usually authorized if aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances. 3 What happens if the jury or judge believes
that aggravating circumstances somewhat outweigh mitigating circumstances?
Must the factfinder be convinced merely by a preponderance of the evidence, by
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt? Most statutes
contain no specified standard of proof.4 By default, the standard is one of pre-
ponderance. Why is the standard not "beyond a reasonable doubt" when the
decision is so momentous and final? This article looks at the constitutional im-
plications of the standard of proof in the penalty phase of capital cases.5
* Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law. B.A. 1974, University of Illinois; J.D. 1978, University of
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I. The instruction is based on the language of many statutes, in particular the description of the Pennsylva-
nia statute in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990).
2. See infra notes 82-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of varying standards.
3. See, e.g., AL.A. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(3) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(2) (1987); CAL PENAL
CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.03(D)(1) (Anderson 1987).
4. See infra text accompanying note 144.
5. This article was written prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.
Ct. 3047 (1990). An underlying premise of this article was that the Court would, in all likelihood, decide that the
State must bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of the appropriateness of the death penalty. Therefore, the
standard of proof imposed would be one the state would have to meet. A plurality of the Court in Walton,
however, upheld the Arizona statutory scheme which requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance that
there are "mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." Id. at 3050. The plurality found
Arizona's provision to be constitutional under both the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Justice Scalia, who
provided the fifth vote to affirm the Arizona court's imposition of death, concurred in the judgment only on this
issue. Id. at 3059. Justice Scalia's position that there was no constitutional violation was based on his rejection of
eighth amendment precedent. He did not address an independent fourteenth amendment issue. Id. at 3068.
This article is implicitly criticizing the plurality's decision in Walton. To place the burden on the defendant to
prove that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s) effectively
presumes that death is the appropriate penalty. The plurality accepts this in part by contrasting the penalty phase
with the guilt phase where the state bears the burden of proving the elements of the crime. The distinction is a
false one, however. The burden of proving the elements of the crime is on the state because the state is the moving
party, seeking to deprive a citizen of liberty, and because of the severe nature of the result sought, loss of liberty,
in the penalty phase, the state is the moving party, seking to execute a citizen. Moreoever, the nature of the
result, death, is most certainly as consequential as a loss of liberty.
The penalty phase is not like an ordinary sentencing where there is purely a judgmental decision being made.
The penalty phase involves a more defined decision, typically that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances. In an ordinary sentencing, the judge is simply determining the ultimate issue, the term of years or
probation and its conditions. A capital penalty phase, on the other hand, requires a preliminary finding regarding
the aggravating and mitigating factors, which is much more like a trial decision. In addition, the penalty phase in
a capital case is set up like a trial, a separate evidentiary proceeding where the factfinder must be persuaded. This,
too. distinguishes the penalty phase from an ordinary sentencing proceeding.
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The standard of proof in the penalty phase raises constitutional issues
under both the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment 6
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 This article first ana-
lyzes death penalty cases decided by the United States Supreme Court on
eighth amendment grounds. This eighth amendment section concludes that the
Court is unlikely to require a heightened standard of proof under an eighth
amendment rationale. The next section turns to the Court's capital cases which
have raised independent fourteenth amendment issues, establishing the applica-
bility of the due process clause to death penalty proceedings. The article then
reviews the Court's noncapital cases on appropriate standards of proof in civil
and criminal cases pursuant to due process requirements. This due process sec-
tion sets forth the theoretical justifications for requiring a heightened standard
of proof as a matter of due process. States which have specifically adopted or
rejected a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase of capital
cases are next identified and the constitutional grounds for their decisions dis-
cussed. In the final section, the article proposes that a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard should be required in the penalty phase decision under a due
process analysis.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT DEATH PENALTY CASES
In 1972 the Supreme Court effectively struck down all death penalty stat-
utes in the United States when it decided three cases consolidated as Furman v.
Georgia.8 Although two justices viewed capital punishment as per se unconstitu-
tional as cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment, 9 the other
three justices who voted to reverse the death sentences focused on the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty as violative of the eighth amendment."0 Conse-
Further, the plurality in Walton makes a flawed analogy to the due process decisions which found it constitu-
tional to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove affirmative defenses. The decision in the penalty
phase is distinguishable from affirmative defenses. Placing the burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative
defense is constitutional because the state is not relieved from proving the elements of the crime. In the penalty
phase, however, the equivalent of the elements of the crime is the determination that aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances. Requiring the defendant to prove mitigation sufficient to outweigh aggravation
is comparable to requiring the defendant to disprove the heart of the crime, such as there is no dead person or he
did not intend to kill the victim in a murder prosecution.
It remains to be seen what impact Walton will have on death penalty statutes. it may well be that, in the
future, the primary avenue of challenge to death penalty statutes on burdens of proof and standards of proof will
have to be through state constitutional provisions. In that case, the arguments in this article could be advanced as
the proper interpretation of a state due process provision.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
7. U.S. CONs'r. amend. XIV, § I provides: "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... 
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). As Justice Marshall stated: "[N]ot only does [this decision] involve the lives of
these three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned men and women in this country currently
awaiting execution." Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
9. Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote lengthy opinions explaining why the death penalty should be held
unconstitutional in today's world. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring): Id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
10. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("uncontrolled discretion" of the factfinder); Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (death penalty "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed"); Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not").
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quently, the door was left open for states to adopt death penalty statutes that
avoided the arbitrariness condemned in Furman.
In 1976 the Supreme Court affirmed three death sentences in Gregg v.
Georgia," Jurek v. Texas," and Proffitt v. Florida.'3 The significance was to
give the Court's imprimatur to the three death penalty statutes involved from
Georgia, Texas, and Florida, which provide the foundation for current death
penalty schemes. The basic requirements gleaned from these cases appeared to
be:14 1) a bifurcated proceeding where the penalty was considered separately
from the guilt of the defendant;"5 2) specific standards that narrowed the class
of death-eligible defendants;' 6 3) the consideration of all relevant information,
especially mitigating circumstances, in the penalty phase;' and 4) meaningful
appellate review.' 8 The Court, however, tolerated great variation. The Texas
statute, for example, included specific standards that narrowed the death-eligi-
ble group. Since these standards appeared in the statute's definition of capital
murder,' 9 the factfinder considered those factors in the guilt phase of trial.
Georgia and Florida made those "aggravating" factors a finding in the penalty
phase. 20 In the penalty phase, the Georgia and Florida statutes required the
factfinder to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding on
life or death.2 The Texas statute, still unusual today, required the factfinder to
answer three questions affirmatively in order to impose the death penalty. 2 In
Florida, a jury verdict of life or death was merely advisory to the judge who
II. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
14. Because the Court affirmed the death sentences, there is nothing in the three opinions that sets forth a
court-ordered requirement for a capital statute. In the course of affirming the sentences, however, the Court
emphasized the aspects of the statutes discussed in the text. For an extensive discussion of Gregg, see Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 318-22.
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248.
16. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248.
17. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.8. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of admitting any evidence that could conceivably mitigate. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (evidence of defendant's accomplice status and lack of intent to kill); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (defendant's troubled childhood); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. I (1986). In the same
vein, the Court recently held that North Carolina could not limit the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence to
instances where they unanimously found a particular mitigating factor. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S.Ct. 1227
(1990). The Court seems dedicated to permitting any and all mitigating evidence in the penalty phase.
18. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253.
19. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268.
20. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 & 197; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248.
21. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248. The Florida statute expressly requires a weighing of
factors: whether "there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)(b) (West 1985). The Georgia statute, on the other hand, does not require a "weighing."
The factfinder, however, is to consider all mitigating and aggravating evidence in assessing a penalty. See Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 865 n.1 (1983) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978)).
22. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (quoting TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-76)):
(I) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliber-
ately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasona-
ble in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
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made the actual determination. 3 In Georgia and Texas, the jury's decision was
determinative. 4
In the course of affirming the three death sentences, the Court rejected
several specific challenges to the statutes. The Court also expressly declined to
consider whether the statutes were constitutional in authorizing death for
crimes other than murder.2 5 Most of the rejected arguments centered on the
discretion involved at various points in the capital process. There were argu-
ments that the penalty decision still involved too much unfettered discretion as
to who would receive the death penalty because, for instance: 1) the charging
decision was uncontrolled as to when the death penalty was sought;26 2) some
juries might foreclose consideration of death by finding a lesser included offense
in the guilt phase;27 3) life imprisonment might be imposed arbitrarily because
of a commutation or a jury's uncontrolled grant of mercy;28 and 4) certain ag-
gravating circumstances were too broad or vague.2 9 It was also argued that
questions put to the jury, such as the Texas question of whether a defendant
was likely to be dangerous in the future and the Florida issue of whether a
defendant's participation in a crime was "relatively minor," were beyond the
capacity of jurors to decide. 30 There was also apparently an argument in Proffitt
that a factfinder could consider a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. The
23. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249.
24. See Gregg. 428 U.S. at 197-98; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 (jury operates same as jury in guilt phase
determination).
25. The Georgia statute provided for the death penalty for "murder, kidnaping for ransor or where the
victim is harmed, armed robbery, rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-63 (footnote
omitted) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1972)).
The Florida statute provided for the death penalty for murder and for a sexual battery on a child under 12.
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247 n.4 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09(l) (Supp. 1976-77)).
The Court subsequently struck down the death penalty for rape in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977),
but there is still an open issue for serious felonies such as aircraft hijacking.
26. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254.
27. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254.
28. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199: Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274; Profflitt, 428 U.S. at 254.
29. The Georgia statute was challenged on the basis of one of its aggravating factors which authorizes the
death penalty for a murder that was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.'" This was argued to be vague and overbroad
because any murder could conceivably be categorized under this description. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201. The Su-
preme Court declined to strike down the factor on its face, instead suggesting that the Georgia Supreme Court
could interpret the provision in a constitutional manner. Id.
However, in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Supreme Court subsequently held that the Geor-
gia court had failed to interpret the "wantonly vile" circumstance in a constitutionally narrow manner.
The Supreme Court, in Gregg, did find that two other aggravating circumstances had been interpreted in a
constitutional manner by the Georgia court. Those involved a "'substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions'" and a "'great risk of death to more than one person.'" Gregg, 428 U.S. at 202.
Florida's statute was challenged on the basis of two similar aggravating circumstances. One paralleled the
"wantonly vile" provision in Georgia, although using language of "'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.'" The
other tracked the Georgia provision on creating a risk to many people. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255. Again, the
Supreme Court deferred to the narrrowing construction placed on these provisions by the Florida court. Id. at
255-56.
30. The challenge to the Texas statute focused on the second question, which asks for a determination of
future criminal behavior. The Court rejected this challenge, stating that such a determination is made in setting
bail and in ordinary sentencing decisions. Jurek, 428 U.S. 274-76.
The challenge to the Florida statute also mentioned issues such as whether the defendant acted "'under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,'" and whether the defendant had an impaired capacity
"'to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.'" Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257. Regarding each issue, the Court
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Court clearly indicated its disapproval of the use of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances in footnotes but also indicated that it was unlikely that a nonstat-
utory aggravating circumstance could suffice under the Florida statute a.3  An-
other issue rejected by the Court was that there was too little guidance due to
the lack of assigned weight given to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in the weighing process. 3" Standards of proof in the penalty phase were neither
raised as an issue by the litigants nor discussed by the Court. The Court noted
in passing that the Georgia statute required that an aggravating circumstance
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 The Court also noted that the Texas
statute required that the three penalty phase questions be answered affirma-
tively beyond a reasonable doubt.34 The Court did not comment on Florida's
lack of a statutory standard of proof even concerning the aggravating
circumstances.35
Many issues not litigated in Gregg, Jurek, and Proffitt were raised in sub-
sequent years. The Court consistently reaffirmed the basic procedural structure
of the Georgia, Texas, and Florida statutes. For example, the use of an advisory
jury in Florida was upheld against a sixth amendment challenge.36 Also, despite
the limited language of the three questions in the penalty phase under the Texas
statute, which on their face would not appear to include many mitigating fac-
tors, the Court interpreted the questions to permit all relevant mitigating evi-
dence as constitutionally required.' 7
Some challenges to the Georgia and Florida statutes were sustained, how-
ever. The Court found it was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for
rape as authorized in the Georgia statute.' 8 The Georgia statute, as applied in a
particular case, also unconstitutionally imposed the death penalty on the basis
of the aggravating circumstance of a "wantonly vile" crime because of the stat-
ute's vagueness in describing "wantonly vile."' 39 The Florida death penalty stat-
ute, as applied in a particular case, unconstitutionally prohibited the considera-
indicated, as in Jurek, that juries make such determinations in ordinary lawsuits when evaluating such defenses as
insanity. Id. at 257-58.
31. The Court noted that it was uncertain whether the Florida court would permit a death sentence based on
a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.8, but twice explained why it was unlikely.
One reason was the statutory language limiting the aggravating circumstances to those specified. Id. The other
reason was that in a capital ease based on a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance, the Florida court had "re-
cast" them as statutory factors. Id. at 256 n.14.
32. Id. at 257. The argument was that a jury would not know how to weigh something like "age" or a
"significant" history of criminal conduct and, therefore, a great deal of discretion and arbitrariness would invade
the sentencing decision. The Court answered that these decisions were no different from other decisions made by
juries and that Furman was satisfied by describing the factors to be considered to the jury. Id. at 257-58.
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97.
34. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
35. See statute quoted in Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247 n.4. The Court focused only on the consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Although no statutory provision requires proof of aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt, this standard of proof is required by Florida case law. See State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
36. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
37. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
38. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
39. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980). The Court found that the Georgia court had failed to
adequately interpret the aggravating factor to narrow its construction. Id.
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tion of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 40 Florida was also barred from
executing a defendant who was an accomplice to a felony which resulted in a
death, but who did "not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take
place. . ,"4 and from executing a defendant who is presently insane.42
Two of the issues challenging the Georgia and Florida statutes were raised
in 1976, but not decided. In Gregg, the Court expressly declined to consider
whether the Constitution permitted the death penalty for crimes other than
murder, such as rape.43 On the issue of whether the "wantonly vile" provision of
the Georgia statute was unconstitutionally vague,44 the Gregg Court expressed a
desire to give the state court a chance to narrow the interpretation of the
terms.4
5
The other three issues sustained by the Court, which challenged the Geor-
gia and Florida statutes, were not raised in 1976. It is consistent with the post-
ponement of the rape issue, however, for the Court to have waited for the issues
of a defendant who did not kill or who is presently insane, on the grounds that
the facts of the 1976 cases did not present these issues. In contrast, the Florida
statute, on its face, presented the issue in 1976 of whether the state could limit
mitigating circumstances to those enumerated. 4 It is unclear how the Supreme
Court viewed the issue of limiting mitigating factors in Proffitt. The Court re-
fers in a footnote to the lack of "limiting" language regarding mitigating fac-
tors compared with the aggravating circumstances, 47 which would imply that
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were permissible. In the text of the opin-
ion, however, the Court states approvingly that the judge must "weigh eight
aggravating factors against seven mitigating factors" to decide the penalty.48
This language certainly implies a limitation to the statutory factors.
If the Court modified its original decision in Proffitt to require all nonstatu-
tory mitigating factors to be considered, in general the Court has steadfastly
refused to modify the basic procedural structure and content approved in the
three 1976 cases.49 For example, in Zant v. Stephens,50 the Court refused to
find that the unstructured Georgia penalty phase proceedings violated the man-
40. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987). Even though Florida case law appeared to have
interpreted the statute to permit nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, they were not considered in the instant
case. Id.
41. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
42. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
43. See supra text accompanying note 25.
44. See supra note 29.
45. Id.
46. The language of the Florida statute is quoted in Proffitt. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248 n.6 (quoting FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(6) (Supp. 1976-77)). The "as enumerated" language was eventually deleted by amending the
statute. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
47. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 250 n.8. The implications of this footnote are unclear. The Court is not focusing on
the mitigating factors in this footnote; the focus is on the unlikelihood that nonstatutory aggravating factors could
be considered.
48. Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
49. Besides the two examples in the text, another example is the Court's reliance on the Texas statutory
factor of "future dangerousness" in deciding the constitutionality of California's "Briggs Instruction." California
v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). The Briggs Instruction informed the jury of the potential of a commutation of a
death sentence by the governor. The Court viewed the possibility of commutation as important to the jury's dcci-
sion whether the defendant was too dangerous to ever "return to society." Id. at 1003. By finding the Briggs
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date of Furman.5' In the Court's view, Gregg was determinative.52 The Court
had approved the Georgia procedure as adequately narrowing the class of
death-eligible defendants in 1976.53 The lack of specific standards to instruct
the factfinder how to consider aggravating and mitigating evidence would not
now be deemed a constitutional flaw.54 Similarly, in Pulley v. Harris,5 the
Court refused to require an appellate proportionality review as a constitutional
mandate." Although a proportionality review was statutorily required in the
Georgia statute in Gregg, neither the Florida statute in Proffitt nor the Texas
statute in Jurek had such a requirement.5 Consequently, the Court found that
a proportionality review could not be a constitutional requirement since the
Florida and Texas statutes were held to meet eighth amendment scrutiny with-
out it.58 The Georgia, Texas, and Florida statutes thus are models against which
other death penalty statutes are judged. It is unlikely that the Court will find a
procedural requirement, which is lacking in the Georgia, Texas, and Florida
statutes, to be constitutionally required under the eighth amendment, even
though the argument was not raised in 1976.
The eighth amendment is not the exclusive route, however, for reviewing
death penalty issues. As in any trial, capital cases may involve other constitu-
tional provisions. For example, there may be issues involving the sixth amend-
ment effective assistance of counsel, fourth amendment search and seizure, and
fifth amendment self-incrimination claims. In addition, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment can be independently invoked in criminal cases for
such issues as the right to counsel on appeal, 59 the fairness of pretrial identifica-
tion procedures, 0 who bears the burden of persuasion,8' and the appropriate
standard of proof.6 2 The next section focuses on the due process clause in Su-
preme Court death penalty cases and is followed by a section on the Court's
cases specifically on standards of proof.
Instruction analogous to the Texas "future dangerousness" determination, the Court found the instruction's consti-
tutionality a foregone conclusion since the Texas statute survived constitutional attack. Id.
50. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
51. Id. at 879.
52. Id. at 875.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
56. Id. at 50-51.
57. Id. at 46-51. The Court noted that the Florida courts had judicially required a proportionality review
despite the absence of a statutory mandate. Id. at 46 n.8. The Court emphasized, however, that the Texas proce-
dure was devoid of a proportionality review and, yet, was constitutional. Id. at 48.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
60. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
61. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (burden of persuasion to prove self-defense constitutionally placed
on defendant). Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (burden of persuasion to prove extreme emotional
distress as defense to murder constitutionally placed on defendant).
62. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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II. DUE PROCESS DEATH PENALTY CASES
The requirements distilled from the 1976 death penalty cases, decided
under the eighth amendment, were largely procedural. The due process clause,
rather than the cruel and unusual punishment clause, might have been at least
an equally logical choice for constitutional procedural guarantees. Possibly the
Court pursued restrictions on the death penalty through eighth amendment
analysis because, one year prior to Furman, the Court handed down McGautha
v. California.5 McGautha held that the failure to guide the jury's discretion on
life or death did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.6 4 However, McGautha is relegated to a meaningless status in subsequent
cases. In Furman, MeGautha is both distinguished on the ground that Mc-
Gautha was based on the fourteenth instead of the eighth amendment 5 and
outright repudiated.6" In Gregg, the Court essentially limited McGautha to its
facts, without future import, because the assumption in McGautha that stan-
dards could not be developed to guide the jury in the penalty phase was no
longer valid.67 Nevertheless, the Court largely developed standards for death
penalty proceedings through an eighth amendment rationale. The reliance on
the eighth amendment, however, does not preclude due process constraints on
the penalty process.68
The Supreme Court has applied the due process clause to the penalty phase
post-Furman. Although a plurality opinion, in Gardner v. Florida,9 the Court
held that denying the defendant access to information in a presentence report
violated his due process right to an "opportunity to deny or explain" the facts in
the report.7 0 In another case, the Court held that the exclusion of defense evi-
dence in the penalty phase pursuant to a state evidentiary rule violated the due
63. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). For an excellent discussion of MeGautha, see Weisberg, supra note 14. at 308-14.
64. 402 U.S. at 196.
65. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 n.12 (Stewart, J., concurring) (McGautha limited to due process and equal
protection).
66. Id. at 248 n.1 I (Douglas, J., concurring) (if eighth amendment renders arbitrary imposition of death
penalty unconstitutional, then it must be unconstitutional under the due process clause as well)- Id. at 295 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (acknowledges McGautha, but dismisses it without much discussion); Id. at 329 n.36 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (dismisses McGautha and focuses on eighth amendment theory).
67. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 931 n.* (5th Cir. 1987) (Gar-
wood, J., concurring), revd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (McGautha rendered a "dead letter" by
Furman and Gregg).
68. See, e.g., Note, A Procedural Due Process Argument for Proportionality Review in Capital Sentencing,
21 COLUM. J.L. AND SOC. PROBs. 385 (1988), for an argument that the due process clause should require a
proportionality review, even though such review is not required under the eighth amendment.
69. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
70. Id. at 362.
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process clause.7 ' There are, thus, due process constraints in the sentencing as
well as the guilt phase of a capital case.72
Moreover, the Court has treated the due process issues as independent and
distinct from cruel and unusual punishment issues in capital cases. Several cases
illustrate the distinct focus under each amendment. In a recent case, the Court
rejected eighth and fourteenth amendment73 arguments that a capital defendant
in Missisippi has a constitutional right to a trial jury decision on the weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 74 The fourteenth amendment
analysis centered on whether the defendant was being deprived of his liberty
without due process of law if state law guaranteed a jury decision for a death
sentence.7 5 In contrast, the focus of the eighth amendment issue was on the
content of the sentencing decision. The defendant argued that an appellate
court could not adequately consider the mitigating evidence presented at trial.76
In another case, the Court distinguished a fourteenth amendment vagueness
challenge based on lack of notice from an eighth amendment vagueness chal-
lenge based on giving the factfinder too much discretion to yield a nonarbitrary
punishment.7 7 Another related example is the Court's analysis of the issues on
the execution of an insane defendant.78 Executing an insane person constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment because it offends the "fundamental human dig-
nity that the Amendment protects. 179  The procedures in the particular state
also violated due process because the defendant was denied an opportunity to be
71. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). For a lengthier discussion of Gardner and Green, see Note, The
Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 354-
56 (1984). See also Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978), where, in a per curiam opinion, the Court found a
due process violation where it was not clear that the jury had found the aggravating circumstance to exist which
formed the basis for the capital sentence. Subsequent to the article, the Court decided Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376 (1986), where the Court noted that Presnell was essentially overruled to the extent the decision relied
upon an assumption that the jury was constitutionally required to find the aggravating factor rather than an
appellate court. Id. at 387-88 n.4. Even though the particular application of the due process clause to the penalty
phase is no longer valid, because of an assumption about the role of the jury, Presnell is another instance where
the Court turned to the due process clause. The difficulty is in knowing how closely the penalty phase is analogous
to a trial. See infra text accompanying notes 181-88.
72. Courts have relied upon the capital cases as authority for applying the due process clause in noncapital
sentencing proceedings as well. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541
(10th Cir. 1987).
73. The Court also rejected a sixth amendment claim to a right to a jury trial in the penalty phase on the
basis of Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
74. Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990). The Mississippi Supreme Court held that, if an aggra-
vating factor considered by the trial jury (that the crime was "especially heinous") was constitutionally invalid,
the death sentence was still valid on the basis of another aggravating factor (pecuniary gain). The court found
that aggravating circumstances still outweighed mitigating circumstances. The United States Supreme Court held
it was constitutional for an appellate court to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances when the aggra-
vating circumstance considered by the trial jury is no longer valid.
75. Id. at 1447. The Court found state law had not been interpreted to create an absolute guarantee of a
jury.
76. Id. at 1448. The Court rejected this argument and found that the appellate reweighing would satisfy the
eighth amendment.
77. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). The Court held that Oklahoma's aggravating circumstance
of "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
78. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
79. Id. at 406.
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heard. 80 The due process clause thus retains its own life as an independent con-
stitutional command in the penalty phase of a capital case.
The applicability of the due process clause is only the beginning point,
however. As the Court has stated, "[T]he question remains what process is
due. .. ."81 One aspect of due process is the standard of proof utilized. The
next section discusses the development of the Supreme Court's cases on the due
process constraint of an appropriate standard of proof. Issues involving stan-
dards of proof have not been addressed in the Supreme Court's capital cases.
Therefore, the next section reviews the Court's noncapital cases on standards of
proof to lay a foundation for a discussion of the lower court cases which have
faced the issue of an appropriate standard of proof in the penalty phase of a
capital case.
III. DUE PROCESS CASES ON STANDARDS OF PROOF
The United States Supreme Court has addressed standards of proof in sev-
eral important noncapital cases. In determining an appropriate standard of
proof, the Court's analysis focused on risks of error and the symbolic effect.82
These cases did not involve the issue whether there should be a standard of
proof. Instead, the issue was the constitutionality under due process scrutiny of
the standard used. Thus, the cases do not directly provide guidance on the
threshold issue in the penalty phase of capital cases of whether a standard of
proof is needed. However, the cases do define the function of a standard of
proof which is critical to an analysis whether a standard of proof is appropriate
in the penalty phase and, if so, what the standard should be.
In re Winship8 is the Court's major statement on standards of proof in
criminal cases. The Court held that a state must prove juvenile delinquency,
where the delinquency is determined by the commission of what would be a
crime under adult standards, beyond a reasonable doubt. 84 The due process
clause was held to protect juveniles in that situation to the same extent as adults
charged with crime.85 The long history of the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard in criminal cases was discussed as indicative that the standard is basic to
our concept of due process. 86 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard reduces
the chance of convicting an innocent person.87 The use of the highest standard
reflects society's unwillingness to tolerate an erroneous decision on the particu-
80. Id. at 413.
81. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
82. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) ("raising the standard of proof would have both
practical and symbolic consequences").
83. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
84. Id. at 368.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 361-62.
87. Id. at 363. See also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.").
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lar issue (here guilt of a crime).88 As Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence,
"[T]he choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disu-
tility of [erroneous decisions for each side]. '89 Thus, in a criminal case, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard indicates a greater social disutility in con-
victing an innocent person than in acquitting a guilty person.90 The interests of
the criminally accused in loss of liberty and stigma of conviction are assessed as
being much greater than society's interest. 1 In addition to the risk of error
analysis, the Court noted that the high standard conveys to the trier the "degree
of confidence" needed to render a decision.92 The Court expressed concern that
the "moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. '93
In subsequent cases,9" the Court emphasized both the risk of error and the
symbolic effect of a standard of proof when requiring a heightened standard of
proof.95 The Court found that a clear and convincing standard was constitution-
ally necessary after balancing the interests in risking error in involuntary civil
commitment9 8 and termination of parental rights.97 In the civil commitment and
parental rights cases, the individual's interest was of such magnitude that the
Court found there was a need to reduce the risk of an erroneous decision in
favor of the government. 98 The Court also found that a higher standard of proof
was of symbolic significance in representing society's value in the individual's
interest in liberty and parental rights. 9 The significance of these interests is
conveyed to the factfinder through instructions on the standard of proof.'00
In contrast, where the nature of the interest or the impact of the decision is
88. Id. at 363. See also id. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Court refined its Winship analysis in subsequent cases involving affirmative defenses. In particular, in
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Court essentially limited the requirement of a beyond a reasona-
ble doubt standard to statutorily defined elements of a crime. The Court held it was constitutional to place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense that did not negate an element of the crime.
Id. at 206-07.
89. Winship, 397 U.S. at 371.
90. Id. at 372.
91. Id. at 363-64.
92. Id. at 364.
93. Id.
94. See also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (clear and convincing standard required in case
involving the diversion of interstate water). The Court viewed the potential harm from diversion of water and the
need for "stability in property rights and in putting resources to their most efficient uses" as strong interests which
compelled the state proposing to divert interstate water to bear a greater risk of an erroneous decision than a mere
preponderance standard affords. Id. at 316. The Court further viewed the heightened standard as representative of
the societal interest in the security of interstate water. Id. at 315-16.
95. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). The Court has
also found a clear and convincing standard necessary in deportation and denaturalization proceedings. See cases
discussed in Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
96. Addlngton, 441 U.S. at 418.
97. Santosky. 455 U.S. at 745.
98. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-29; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-68. See also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467
U.S. 310 (1984).
99. Addington. 441 U.S. at 425-26; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764. See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750-51 (1987) (the Court relied, in part, on the use of the heightened "clear and convincing" standard to
justify the intrusion upon an "individual's strong interest in liberty" by the pretrial detention provisions of the Bail
Reform Act).
100. Santosky. 441 U.S. at 764-65; Colorado, 467 U.S. at 315-16.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
less significant, a lower standard is acceptable to the Court. For instance, the
Court upheld a statutory provision which required a five-year minimum
mandatory sentence if the judge found by a preponderance that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of specified crimes.101 The
Court rejected the argument that this sentencing guideline created a new ele-
ment of the crime which would necessitate a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
under Winship and its progeny.102 It is important to note that the mandatory
sentence did not increase the penalty beyond the term of years authorized for
the crime; it merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion on incarcera-
tion.103 The Court distinguished an ordinary sentencing procedure in McMillan
from an unusual one,104 such as where a penalty could be greatly increased by a
sentencing finding.'0 5 Where the impact of the sentencing finding is significant,
the Court indicated there could be constitutional concerns.10
The Court has similarly noted a concern for risk allocation and the serious-
ness of the decision in a case upholding a preponderance standard for a determi-
nation of paternity. In Rivera v. Minnich,'0 7 the Court distinguished Winship,
the involuntary civil commitment, and parental rights cases, where a higher
standard of proof was required, for three reasons. First, there was no right, such
as a parental relationship, that was being taken away. 0 8 Thus, the nature of the
interest was less significant in a paternity case. Second, the proceedings were
between two individuals rather than between an individual and the state. 00 The
Court saw no reason to impose a greater risk of erroneous decision on one party
when they were both private interests."10 In contrast, where the state is pitted
against an individual, the Court emphasized a need for a higher standard of
proof because of unequal resources and because often the consequences are so
serious in such cases."'
The Court has similarly found that preliminary determinations on the ad-
missibility of evidence in criminal trials do not warrant a higher standard than
preponderance. The Court has contrasted these admissibility decisions with the
101. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
102. Id. at 86-87. In particular, the Court found that the sentencing finding was not an element of the crime
requiring a heightened standard pursuant to its analysis in Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197. See supra note 88.
103. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88.
104. This characterization as an ordinary sentencing was recently relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in holding
that a preponderance standard was sufficient for the judge's findings under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See
United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
105. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-91. The Court referred to Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), where a
defendant convicted of a sexual offense with a maximum 10-year penalty could receive life imprisonment upon a
sentencing finding of the defendant's continued dangerousness, habitual criminality, or mental illness. In Specht
the Court held that the sentencing process without a formal hearing violated due process. The Court in McMillan
indicates that there also might have been a due process issue regarding the standard of proof if the Court reviewed
such a sentencing proceeding now in the aftermath of Winship, which had not been decided when the Court
considered Specht. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-91.
106. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-91.
107. 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
108. Id. at 579-82.
109. Id. at 580-81.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. The Court also viewed a higher standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights as a means to
force .nme finalitv on issues that. unlike paternity, could be continually relitiRated. Id. at 582.
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substantive decisions in a criminal trial that have a greater impact.112 Conse-
quently, with few exceptions,11 3 the Court has found that a preponderance is
sufficient for decisions on the admissibility of evidence that is subject to fourth
and fifth amendment strictures, such as the voluntariness of a consent to
search"14 or a confession" 5 and the adequacy of a waiver of Miranda rights ."6
Similarly, the Court has held that nonconstitutional preliminary evidentiary is-
sues are subject to a preponderance determination. For example, the trial judge
must find by only a preponderance that a conspiracy exists in order to admit a
co-conspirator statement under a hearsay exemption."17 These preliminary is-
sues affect only the admissibility of evidence and are not the final decisions on
guilt or innocence.
Whether preliminary matter or final issue, the standard of proof is impor-
tant whenever a decision is being made where there is a risk of error. The stan-
dard advises the decisionmaker of the level of confidence necessary in order to
make the decision. It also reflects society's judgment on the relative weight to be
given to the interests of each party. In this line of cases on standards of proof,
the Supreme Court consistently analyzed the relative importance of the inter-
ests at stake, including the consequences of the decision, and the resulting need
for shifting the allocation of risk. Thus, preliminary evidentiary matters, with a
modest impact compared with issues deciding the cases, do not necessitate
heightened review. Similarly, a reduction in sentencing discretion in a typical
proceeding, which does not change the nature of the permissible sentence, is not
significant enough to warrant an increased standard of proof. Even a substan-
tive determination, such as paternity, does not require a heightened standard of
proof where the interests are of equal value. However, when the individual's
interest at stake, such as parental rights, liberty from involuntary civil commit-
ment or criminal incarceration, is of greater value, a higher standard of proof is
constitutionally imposed. The higher standard protects the valued interest, allo-
cating the risk of error to the other party (most often the state or federal gov-
ernment). Moreover, society's judgment of the high value attached to the inter-
est is communicated to the decisionmaker by instructions on the standard of
112. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) ("[t]hus, the evidentiary standard is unrelated to
the burden of proof on the substantive issues. .. ").
113. One exception is the admissibility of an in-court identification after a post-indictment lineup without
counsel. The lineup would be per se inadmissible as a violation of the right to counsel under the sixth amendment
pursuant to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The in-court identification is permitted if the govern-
ment can "establish by clear and convincing evidence" that the in-court identification has a basis independent of
the lineup. Id. at 240.
114. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
115. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
116. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). The Court found a preponderance sufficient where the
interests being compared were deterring police coercion and the admissibility of probative evidence. The Court
viewed the deterrence purpose as unconnected with the reliability of the evidence. Thus, a preponderance was
sufficient where the purpose was irrelevant to the reliability of the verdict. Id. at 167-69.
117. Bourjaily. 483 U.S. 171. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a co-conspirator's statement is
"nonhearsay," rather than an "exception" to the hearsay rule. The proponent of the evidence must establish that
the declarant was a co-conspirator of the party against whom it is offered and that the statement was made during
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
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proof. Our judicial system thus achieves its purpose of rendering decisions with
the degree of certitude proportional to the interests at stake.
Although in this line of cases on standards of proof the Supreme Court has
not grappled with the standard of proof in a capital case, lower courts have
faced the issue whether to require a heightened standard of proof in capital
cases. The lower courts' analyses have invoked the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and statutory construction principles. The next two sections ad-
dress, respectively, 1) states adopting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard and
2) states rejecting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase of
capital cases.
IV. STATES ADOPTING A BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN THE
PENALTY PHASE
Seven states require that the jury reach a determination beyond a reasona-
ble doubt in the penalty phase. They are Arkansas, Colorado, New Jersey,
Ohio, Texas, Utah and Washington. The precise decision that must be made
beyond a reasonable doubt, such as finding "aggravating circumstances out-
weigh mitigating circumstances" or that "death is the appropriate remedy,"
varies in each state. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is statutorily pre-
scribed in five of the seven states. The other two states require the high stan-
dard as a result of a state supreme court decision."18
Ohio, New Jersey, Arkansas, Washington, and Texas have a statutory re-
quirement that a penalty phase determination be made beyond a reasonable
doubt. The precise determination to which the standard is applied varies, how-
ever. Thus, although each of the five states is similar in requiring a decision
beyond a reasonable doubt, each differs in its wording of the penalty decision.
Ohio and New Jersey are the most straightforward. Their statutes provide that
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating fac-
tors outweigh the mitigating factors." 9 Arkansas has a similar "outweighing"
118. Although New Jersey now has a statutorily prescribed beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the New
Jersey Supreme Court had interpreted its prior statute, which was silent on the standard, to require a determina-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. Both the New Jersey statute and the court decision will be discussed. See infra
notes 119 and 124-44 and accompanying text. North Carolina is a third state where the state supreme court
appeared to interpret its statute to require a finding that, after weighing aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the jury "was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death penalty is justified
and appropriate in this case." State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. I, 34, 301 S.E.2d 308, 327-28 (1983). See also Note,
Criminal Procedure-North Carolina's Capital Sentencing Procedure: The Struggle for an Acceptable Jury In-
struction, 62 N.C.L. REV. 833, 840 n.47 (1984). However, in subsequent decisions, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has affirmed death verdicts despite challenges to jury instructions that failed to state a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 32, 316 S.E.2d 197, 214 (1984); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408,
432, 319 S.E.2d 189, 205 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985). Consequently, North Carolina is not dis-
cussed here as a state that requires a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
119. OHlto REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Baldwin 1990) provides:
The prosecution shall have the burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravat-
ing circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the factors in
mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 1990) provides: "If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the
verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors."
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requirement that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 ° Additionally,
however, Arkansas requires a finding that "[a]ggravating circumstances justify
a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt" before death may be im-
posed. 12 1 Washington's statute is a variation on Ohio's, but worded as a nega-
tive instead of an affirmative determination. The determination is whether the
sentencer is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency." 122 The Texas determination is dif-
ferent in content from the others. To impose death, the sentencer must deter-
mine each of three issues beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencer must find
that the murder was "committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that the death . . . would result"; that there is a probability that the de-
fendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society; and, if pertinent, whether the killing was "unreasonable in
response to the provocation" by the victim.' 23 Despite the variations in statutory
language, the effect of each statute is to require the sentencer to be certain that
death is warranted beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the standard of proof is
statutory, the reasoning behind adopting the standard is not as apparent as it is
from the court decisions of Colorado, New Jersey and Utah.
New Jersey, Utah and Colorado state supreme court decisions have enunci-
ated a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for the penalty determination where
the statute is silent.124 Although the New Jersey statute now expressly contains
a beyond a reasonable doubt standard as noted above, 125 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court interpreted an older statute to require the same high standard. 2
The older statute stated only that the jury must find that aggravating circum-
stances were not outweighed by mitigating circumstances." 27 Similar to Arkan-
sas' statute, Utah's penalty determination is a two-pronged one. The jury must
find both that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances
and that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt.128 The
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(2) (1987) provides that the jury must find that: "Aggravating circum-
stances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist."
121. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(3).
122. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (Supp. 1989).
123. TEX STAT. ANN. art. 37.071(b) and (c) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The full text of the statute provides:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following three issues to
the jury:
(I) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any by the deceased.
(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a
special verdict of "yes" or "no" on each issue submitted.
124. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989);
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1990).
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
126. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130.
127. Id. at 58. 524 A.2d at 153. See also "Historical Note" to NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3 (West Supp.
1990).
128. See Wood, 648 P.2d at 78-81.
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statute states neither the two-pronged determination nor any standard of
proof.120 Although the Colorado statute was originally a two-pronged process
like the Utah statute,130 it now provides for a single finding by the jury that if
"there are insufficient. . . mitigating factors . . . to outweigh any. . . aggra-
vating factors . . the jury shall return a sentence of death."''3 All three state
supreme courts acknowledged that the weighing process in the penalty phase
was not a fact-finding process.'12 Each court, however, recognized a need for
certainty in deciding on death as a punishment that demands our legal system's
highest standard. 3 3
Much of the rationale of each court is grounded in concepts implicit in the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause and the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment clause. In Biegenwald,"14 for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied on a classic due process idea: "What is at stake is the
fundamental fairness of a system that generates life and death decisions." 35 In
the course of two decisions, the Utah Supreme Court referred to eighth amend-
ment and due process ideas. The court stated that "the death penalty may be
imposed only when consistent with 'the fundamental respect for humanity un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment.' "136 The court also referred to the "basic pro-
cedural requirements of the Due Process Clause"'3 7 that impose a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases to assure a "high degree of certi-
tude."' a8 The court found that such a high degree of certitude "conveys to the
jury the concept that the values upon which the criminal justice system is built
do not permit the ultimate sanction to be imposed unless the conclusion is free
of substantial doubt . . ,,."" The Colorado court also relied on concepts from
both amendments. The court cited to an eighth amendment concept of reliabil-
ity because death is such a unique penalty 40 and to a due process concept of
the "degree of certainty" that should be necessary to render a death verdict. 41
None of the three courts, however, ultimately based its requirement of a
penalty determination beyond a reasonable doubt on the Constitution. Each
court relied upon an interpretation of its own statutory scheme. Although using
129. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1989) outlines the procedures for conducting the penalty phase
proceedings, including convention of the same jury, presentation of evidence, unanimity of the verdict, and appeal
process, but does not spell out the precise determination to be made.
130. People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786, 791 (Colo. 1990).
131. ld. at 796 n.13.
132. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. at 62, 524 A.2d at 156; Holland, 777 P.2d at 1027 n.4, quoting Wood, 648 P.2d
at 84; Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 794.
133. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. at 60, 524 A.2d at 155 ("We can think of no judgment of any jury in this state in
any case that has as strong a claim to the requirement of certainty as does this one."); Wood, 648 P.2d at 81
(need for a high degree of confidence that the penalty is appropriate) and at 84 ("the necessity for a high degree
of certitude"); Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 794 (a beyond a reasonable doubt standard "serves well to communicate to
the jurors the degree of certainty that they must possess.
134. 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130.
135. Id. at 66, 524 A.2d at 158.
136. Wood, 648 P.2d at 81.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 84.
139. Id. at 84 n. 11, quoting State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 275 (Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., concurring).
140. Tenneson. 788 P.2d at 792.
141. Id. at 795.
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the constitutional concept of "fundamental fairness," the New Jersey court indi-
cated that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions" in New
Jersey "antedates any suggestion that the Constitution compels that burden.' 4 2
The court never cited the federal or state constitutions. The "fundamental fair-
ness" concept appeared to be considered a state common law idea.143 The New
Jersey court also found support in the legislative history of both the old and new
death penalty statutes where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was dis-
cussed.144 The Utah court looked to the general provisions of the state criminal
code that provide that the code should be interpreted to provide for proportion-
ate penalties 45 and to avoid "arbitrary or oppressive treatment" of accused per-
sons.148 Although citing extensively to eighth and fourteenth amendment cases,
the Colorado court rested its requirement upon an interpretation of legislative
intent to want to ensure the constitutionality and reliability of the verdict. 47
Thus, there is no direct state court holding that a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is constitutionally required. The high standard of proof is either
an explicit statutory requirement (as in Ohio, Arkansas, Washington, Texas,
and the current New Jersey code), or an interpretation of a statute on the basis
of general principles of statutory construction (Colorado, Utah and the older
New Jersey code).
States rejecting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, on the other hand,
have had to wrestle with the constitutional issues. Those states are discussed
next.
V. STATES REJECTING A BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN THE
PENALTY PHASE
Courts interpreting the statutes of eleven states have explicitly rejected a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase. 4 These states are
Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
142. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. at 53, 59, 524 A.2d at 154.
143. The court, at one point, referred to the suggestion of a beyond a reasonable doubt standard contained in
the report of the "Trial Judges' Committee on Capital Causes" as "presumably based on New Jersey's traditional
concern for the rights of defendants charged with capital offenses." Biegenwald, 106 N.J. at 58-59, 524 A.2d at
154.
144. Id. at 62-66, 524 A.2d at 156-57.
145. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982), quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-104(3) (1953)(now
1990 Replacement).
146. Id. quoting from UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-104(4) (1953) (now 1990 Replacement).
147. Tenneson, 788 P.2d at 792 n.9.
148. A challenge to the Arizona statute on the grounds it did not provide for a penalty finding beyond a
reasonable doubt was also rejected by a federal district court in 1986. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F.Supp. 1334, 1362
(D. Ariz. 1986), rev'don other grounds, 832 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'dsub nom. Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct.
3092 (1990). The Ninth Circuit subsequently held the Arizona death penalty scheme unconstitutional for requir-
ing the defendant to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance before the trier may
consider such factors and for placing the burden of proof on the defendant to establish that mitigating circum-
stances outweigh aggravating circumstances. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1041 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3287 (1990). However, the United States Supreme Court has just recently upheld the Arizona
scheme in Walton v. Arizona, I10 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
The issue of the standard of proof has also arisen in a case involving the Wyoming statute. A federal district
court rather summarily rejected a beyond a reasonable doubt requirement as constitutionally mandated. Osborn v.
Shillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 (D. Wyo. 1986), affid, 861 F.2d 612 (1988). Because the federal court did not
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Missouri, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Only one state, Maryland, has an alter-
native standard stated in its statute. 149 The statutes of the other states contain
no standard. Defendants in each of the eleven states argued for a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard on constitutional grounds. In each case, the courts
rejected the constitutional challenge. The reasoning of the opinions is described
in this section. The strengths and weaknesses of the courts' analyses are dis-
cussed subsequently in the final section.
Although the constitutional challenge to the standard of proof is the same,
the penalty determination in the eleven states is expressed in many different
ways. Alabama, California, Indiana, and New Mexico require that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances before death may be im-
posed.'50 Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Oklahoma reverse the determination: Death is authorized if mitigating circum-
stances do not outweigh aggravating circumstances.' 5 ' The result of the weigh-
ing process appears to be determinative of life or death in Alabama, California,
Idaho, Illinois, and Maryland. 52 On the other hand, Florida, Indiana, Missis-
discuss the issue of the standard of proof and the Wyoming court has not addressed the issue, Wyoming is not
included in the discussion of this section.
149. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h) (1957).
150. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1982) (advisory jury) and § 13A-5-47(e) (court determination) (death if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances; also provides that advisory jury must return life if
in equilibrium; if aggravating circumstances do not outweigh mitigating circumstances, jury must return verdict of
life).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (death "shall" be imposed if "aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances").
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e)(2) (West Supp. 1989) (advisory jury and court "may" impose death if "any
mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating . . . circumstances").
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2 (B) (1989) merely provides that the jury or judge decides on life or death on
the basis of "weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against
each other, and considering both the defendant and the crime." New Mexico's statutory language is the least
specific of the states discussed here in defining the determination to be made by the trier. However, the New
Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction 14-7030 provides, in addition to restating the statute, that death can only be
imposed if "aggravating circumstance(s) ... outweigh the mitigating circumstances." Consequently, New Mex-
ico was categorized with those states that define the weighing process in this manner. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text, however, for further discussion of the New Mexico instruction which also provides that the
trier choose life regardless of the outcome of the weighing process.
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) and (3) (West 1985) (advisory jury and then court must determine if
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances).
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1987) ("the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds
that mitigating circumstances which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) ("[i]f the jury determines unanimously that there
are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death).
MD. ANN. CODs art. 27, § 413(h)(2) (1957) ( "If [jury or court] finds that the mitigating circumstances do
not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death").
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2)-(3) (Supp. 1988) ( death is authorized if "there are insufficient mitigating
circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances").
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (death may not be imposed "[i]f the trier finds the
existence of one or more mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances found by the trier").
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West Supp. 1990) (death may not be imposed "if it is found that any
such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances").
152. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(3) (1982) requires the advisory jury to return a verdict of death if the aggra-
vating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. It is less clear whether the court may impose life
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sippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oklahoma authorize the trier to ignore the
result of the weighing process and impose life rather than death if that is the
trier's choice under all the circumstances.' 53
Regardless of the phraseology of the statute, one common threshold reason
for rejecting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is that the weighing process
is not a factual determination. 54 The underlying premise is that standards of
even if aggravating circumstances outweigh death. It does not appear to be an option, however, given the language
of § 13A-5-47(e), which requires the court to make the balancing determination.
CAL PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) requires that the trier impose death if aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances. Although the current uniform jury instruction, I Cal. Jury Instructions, Crim-
inal 8.88 (Supp. 1990), does not instruct in mandatory language, the use of a prior version which did mandate
death was recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990).
See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990). decided five days prior to Boyde, for a fuller discussion
of the constitutionality of the mandatory language.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1987) provides that "the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court
finds that mitigating circumstances. . .outweigh the. . .aggravating circumstance ....
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) provides that death "shall" be imposed "[i]f the
jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
sentence."
MD ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h)(2) (1957) provides: "If (court or jury] finds that the mitigating circum-
stances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death."
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(c) (Vest 1985). The statutory language is phrased in terms of finding
mitigation to outweigh aggravation and then "based on these considerations" [finding an aggravating circum-
stance and then looking at whether mitigation outweighs aggravation], the advisory jury should decide death or
life. On the face of the statute, it appears as though the jury could recommend life even if aggravating factors
outweigh mitigating factors. At one point, the Florida Supreme Court found no error in instructing jurors that
death is presumed appropriate unless mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors. Jackson v. Wainwright, 421
So, 2d 1385 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983). However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held such an instruction unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988). The Eleventh Circuit holding may be of questionable validity in light of
Boyde, 110 S. Ct. 1190 and Blystone, 110 S. Ct. 1078, which upheld an instruction that death must be imposed if
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The court in Florida ultimately decides the
penalty. Although there is nothing specific in the statute, it appears as though the court must only justify its
sentence by balancing aggravating and mitigating factors if it imposes death. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3).
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West Supp. 1989) provides that the jury "may" recommend death if it
balances in favor of aggravating circumstances. See also Williams v. State, 525 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1988). The
court in imposing sentence after an advisory jury is to use the same standards as the jury, so presumably would be
able to exercise discretion. Oddly enough, it is less clear if the court has any discretion in imposing death where
aggravation outweighs mitigation when the penalty is tried exclusively to the court. There the statute provides that
the court "shall" impose death "only if it finds" that "mitigating circumstances ... are outweighed . ... § 35-
50-2-9(g).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2)(d) (Supp. 1988) provides that, even after finding aggravation outweighs
mitigation, the trier is to decide if "[b]ased on these considerations, ... the defendant should be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990) provides that, even if aggravation outweighs mitiga-
tion, life can be imposed "[i]f the trier decides under all of the circumstances not to assess and declare the
punishment of death."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2 (1984) does not express any requirement that the weighing process be determi-
native of the sentence. It treats the weighing process as a "consideration." In addition, Uniform Jury Instruction
14-7030 provides specifically that "even if the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh the mitigating circumstances,
you may still set the penalty at life imprisonment."
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11. Although the statute does not address the impact of finding aggravation
outweighs mitigation, in Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals found the given instructions adequate to express that death was optional even if aggravating
circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances.
154. Whisenhant v. State, 482 So.2d 1225, 1235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), affid, 482 So.2d 1241, 1245 (Ala.
1983) (citations omitted) (" 'While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact suscepti-
ble to proof under a reasonable doubt or preponderance standard, . . . the relative weight is not.' "); People v.
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proof apply to proof of facts, not to normative issues. 155 Since weighing aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances is not proof of a fact, no standard of proof
can apply or is necessary. 156 These courts distinguish finding the existence of an
aggravating circumstance' 57  (which has a standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt)158 and sometimes the existence of a mitigating circumstance1 59 (which
on occasion has a defined standard of a preponderance) as factual decisions.
Labeling the weighing process as a balancing rather than a factual deter-
mination is merely a beginning point. All of the courts rejecting a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard have had to address the issue on a constitutional
basis. There are two constitutional theories on which the courts relied to reject
the standard: a fourteenth amendment due process theory and an eighth amend-
ment cruel and unusual punishment theory.
The due process theory is related to the finding that the balancing of ag-
gravating and mitigating factors is not a "factual" issue. Many of the courts
found that a determination that aggravation outweighs mitigation is not a fac-
tual element of capital murder. 60 Because the weighing process is not an ele-
ment, the courts found there is no due process obligation on the state to prove
aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The second constitutional basis is the eighth amendment. Here the courts
look to the language of United States Supreme Court opinions that speak of
narrowing the class of defendants who are death-eligible, but then permitting
the trier extensive discretion in setting the penalty.' 6 ' This concept is inter-
preted to support and condone the lack of a standard of proof to guide the trier
in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.263 The idea is that the
Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 779, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 698, 726 P.2d 113, 144 (1986) ("the sentencing function is
inherently moral and normative, not factual"); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 905, 674 P.2d 396, 401 (1983)
(weighing process "not susceptible" to proof); Moore v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1281 (Ind.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1026 (1985) (weight not fact, but "balancing process"); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 684 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc) (not a factual determination, but "a more subjective process"); Johnson, 731 P.2d at 1005, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 878 (not factual, but a "balancing process"); Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishes "proof of facts" from "the weighing of facts in sentencing").
155. See Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Bolder, 635 S.W.2d at 684.
156. See Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Bolder, 635 S.W.2d at 684.
157. Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Whisenhant, 482 So.2d at 1235; Sivak, 105 Idaho at 905, 674 P.2d at 401.
158. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1988); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1988); Mo
ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
159. See, e.g., Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818.
160. Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Whisenhant, 482 So. 2d at 1234-35.
161. The courts are referring to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard laid out as a due process require-
ment in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977), which held that the State is only required to prove the facts constituting the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt and does not have to bear the burden to disprove an affirmative defense that does not negate an
element. See Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Whisenhant, 482 So.2d at 1234-35; Johnson v. State, 731 P.2d 993,
1005; People v. Garcia, 97 II1. 2d 58, 80, 454 N.E.2d 274, 283 (1983); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 732, 415
A.2d 830, 849 (1980). Patterson has received criticism for its simplistic approach not satisfying due process the-
ory. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases: Harmonizing the Views of the Justices, 20
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 393 (1983).
162. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d at 777-78, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98, 726 P.2d at 143-44; Sivak, 105
Idaho at 905, 674 P.2d at 401.
163. See. e.g., Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Sivak, 105 Idaho at 905, 674 P.2d at 401; Moore v. State, 479
N.E.2d 1264, 1275 (Ind.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1206 (1985); People v. Eddmonds, 101 III. 2d 44, 67-68, 461
N.E.2d 347, 359, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 894 (1984).
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trier has complete discretion in assessing the weight of the factors.164 The trier
could find one mitigating factor, for instance, outweighs five aggravating fac-
tors. Consequently, a standard of proof is either unnecessary or counterproduc-
tive.'65 The courts view the constitutional guarantee of a nonarbitrary penalty
as satisfied by allowing the consideration of all relevant information on aggra-
vating and mitigating factors.166 These courts often further point to rejection of
constitutional challenges to death penalty statutes by the United States Su-
preme Court as approval of standardless penalty proceedings. 67 The courts
most frequently cite Gregg and Proffitt as examples of constitutional death pen-
alty schemes without a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, even though the
Court did not directly address the issue of a standard in those cases.1 68
The statutes of eleven states have, thus, survived constitutional challenge
for imposing death without a beyond a reasonable doubt determination. The
constitutional analysis has not been fully developed, however, either through the
cases rejecting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard or through those adopting
such a standard. No court has directly found a constitutional rationale for re-
quiring a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, 69 although undoubtedly the im-
petus for the statutory standards in the five states with a prescribed beyond a
reasonable doubt standard was concern for either fundamental fairness or chan-
neling the discretion of the sentencer.270 The courts which have held that the
Constitution does not require the heightened scrutiny have not gone beneath the
surface of the due process issue. The final section discusses the constitutional
arguments for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase.
VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE FOR REQUIRING A BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN CAPITAL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS
Both the policy behind using a standard of proof and constitutional law
provide strong arguments for incorporating a beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard into the penalty phase of capital cases. This section addresses the argu-
ments and likelihood of success under eighth and fourteenth amendment theo-
ries. The eighth amendment is rejected as a viable basis for a beyond a
reasonable doubt requirement in light of current Supreme Court decisions. An
164. See, e.g., Whisenhant, 428 So. 2d at 1234; 101 Ill. 2d at 67-68, 461 N.E.2d at 358.
165. See Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d at 68, 461 N.E.2d at 359; Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d at 80, 454 N.E.2d at 283.
166. See Moore, 479 N.E.2d at 1282, quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982); Garcia, 97
III. 2d at 68, 454 N.E.2d at 283.
167. See Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1107 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983); Strickland,
696 F.2d at 818; Bolder, 635 S.W.2d at 684; Moore, 479 N.E.2d at 1280; Garcia, 97 i1. 2d at 68, 454 N.E.2d at
283; Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427, 442 (Miss. 1983); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 687, 733, 415 A.2d 830, 850
(1980).
168. Gray, 677 F.2d at 1107; Strickland, 696 F.2d at 818; Bolder, 635 S.W.2d at 684 (Proffitt); Moore, 479
N.E.2d at 1281 (Proffitt); Garcia, 97 Ill. 2d at 68, 454 N.E.2d at 283 (Gregg and Proffitt); Tichnell, 287 Md. at
733, 415 A.2d at 850 (Proffitt, Gregg, and Jurek) (Jurek is inappropriately cited since the Texas statute specifi-
cally states a beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 124-47, where the reliance on statutory construction rather than a
constitutional basis is discussed.
170. See, e.g., the discussion of the reasoning of the New Jersey court just prior to the amendment of the
statute. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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analysis under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, however,
supplies a compelling, independent theory on which to base a beyond a reasona-
ble doubt requirement in the penalty phase.
A. Eighth Amendment Theory
The heart of eighth amendment jurisprudence in capital cases has been to
eliminate the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.' 7' Requiring a high de-
gree of certitude in making the decision to impose death would certainly ad-
vance the nonarbitrariness of the penalty by providing guidance to the
factfinder. 1 2 It would be one more assurance that only the most heinous offend-
ers would be separated out to receive the death penalty. A high standard of
proof would also be consistent with the use of the eighth amendment to provide
procedural as well as substantive protection in capital cases.'7
However, the Supreme Court would, in all likelihood, reject an eighth
amendment argument on the grounds that the Georgia and Florida statutes ap-
proved in 1976 contained no beyond a reasonable doubt standard .'7  The Texas
statute, also approved in 1976, did require findings beyond a reasonable
doubt, 1 5 but the Court has already indicated repeatedly that conformance with
any one of the three statutes approved in 1976 is sufficient.'77 Most lower courts
have rejected an eighth amendment argument, in part on the basis that there
was no such requirement in Gregg or Proffitt.17 7 Even the two states where a
state court, rather than the legislature, adopted a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard did so on the basis of statutory construction rather than an eighth
amendment theory.'7 8 Although it is arguable that the Court in fact modified
the original procedure approved in Proffitt when it later held that nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances had to be permitted under the Florida scheme, 77 the
predominant line of cases refuses to consider new challenges to the procedures
171. See supra text accompanying notes 10 and 17. See also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988)
as an example of the Court continuing to reiterate the need for "reliability on the determination that death is the
appropriate penalty in a particular case."
172. Despite all the requirements imposed through the eighth amendment on states to assure a nonarbitrary
sentence, there is room for arbitrariness each step of the way. See discussion of arbitrariness in each stage of a
capital case, from the decision to seek death to post-conviction proceedings, in Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797
(1986).
173. The Court has used the eighth amendment to impose both procedural and substantive requirement in
death penalty cases. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment has been
recognized to affect significantly both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the death penalty.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 33 & 35.
175. See supra text accompanying note 34.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58. Although it is interesting to note that in Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983), quoting from Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). the court took particular
note of the Florida judicially imposed rule that a trial judge cannot override an advisory jury verdict of life unless
"'virtually no reasonable person could differ.'" (citations omitted). Thus, the Court was relying, in part, on a
heightened standard of proof in one aspect of the Florida system to uphold it.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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approved in 1976.180 Thus, despite the fact that no one challenged the failure to
have a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase in 1976, the
argument is probably pointless today under an eighth amendment theory.
B. Due Process Theory
An analysis of a due process theory involves an examination of the nature
of the decision being made in the penalty phase as well as the Supreme Court's
decisions on standards of proof. This subsection first looks at the preliminary
question of the need for a standard of proof for the penalty phase decision. The
second part of this subsection focuses on the Supreme Court's decisions to jus-
tify beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard of proof.
1. The Need for a Standard of Proof
The need for a standard of proof is in part dependent upon the preliminary
question of who bears the burden of persuasion on the penalty phase decision.
Although a plurality of the Supreme Court has upheld placing the burden of
persuasion on the defendant,'' the Court failed to appreciate the nature of the
penalty proceeding. The penalty phase operates largely as a trial, not as a typi-
cal sentencing proceeeding.' 82 There is usually a right to a jury, evidence is
presented with observance of the rules of evidence, and argument is made to the
factfinder.'1' As Justice O'Connor stated in a recent concurring opinion, "As a
practical matter we have virtually required that the death penalty be imposed
only when a guilty verdict has been followed by separate trial-like sentencing
proceedings, and we have extended many of the procedural restrictions applica-
ble during criminal trials into these proceedings."'" 4 Applying the analogy to a
trial, the critical weighing decision in the penalty phase of a capital case is
comparable to the elements of a crime in the guilt phase. Just as the state must
prove the elements of a crime' 85 and an aggravating circumstance,88 by anal-
ogy, the state should prove that death is the appropriate penalty or, as it is
typically stated, that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circum-
stances.' 8 7 The state is charged with proving "every fact necessary to constitute
180. See supra text accompanying notes 50-58. See also Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 737, 765 (1985).
181. Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990).
182. See, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981) (distinguishing capital penalty phase from
ordinary sentencing).
183. See W. WHITE. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES-AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51-112 (1987) for a description of the penalty phase.
184. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686-87 (1984) (citations omitted) where the Court stated, in the course of requiring effective assistance of counsel
to ensure a fair "trial" in the penalty phase of a capital case: "A capital sentencing proceeding ... is sufficiently
like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision . . . that counsel's role in the
proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. ... Although the Court has been viewed as moving away
from the trial analogy in capital cases, see Weisberg, supra note 14 at 343-45 these recent cases still apply the
analogy. The Court does seem to fluctuate, however. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
185. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
186. See supra note 152.
187. See supra statutes discussed in notes 119-20 and 145.
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the crime"188 in a typical trial. By analogy, the state should have to prove every
fact necessary to impose death as a punishment where the penalty phase oper-
ates as a trial to establish death or life as the appropriate penalty.
Moreover, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
penalty phase is a decision that needs a standard of proof. Although some of the
lower courts, which rejected the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, distin-
guished between a "weighing" and a "factfinding" decision,"8" the label does
not change the need for guidance on the amount of certitude in the decision. 90
In most states, the factfinder must decide if aggravating circumstances in fact
outweigh mitigating circumstances' 9' or if mitigating circumstances are suffi-
cient to outweigh aggravating circumstances.19 Death cannot be the penalty
unless such a finding is made.' 93 The factfinder is still faced with deciding to
what degree he or she is convinced that aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances or that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravat-
ing circumstances.194 Thus, a standard of proof is important to a "weighing"
decision where the sentencer must make a determination that one fact (aggra-
vating circumstances) outweighs another fact (mitigating circumstances).
Recognizing the need for a standard of proof in the penalty phase decision
is only the threshold, however. The inquiry now becomes what the standard
should be. This question is addressed in the next subsection.
2. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt as the Appropriate Standard
There is a compelling argument for a penalty decision "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" based on the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area.
188. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
190. See the excellent discussion by Judge Anderson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Ford v.
Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 879 n.6 (1983), where he states:
[lI]t is both possible and necessary to apply a standard of confidence to [the finding that there are insuffi-
cient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances] whether it is called a finding of
fact or finding which involves a large measure of judgment or policy.
See also, Comment, Capital Punishment and the Burden of Proof. The Sentencing Decision, 17 CAL W.L. REv.
316, 344-348 (1981) (discussion of situations other than a guilt determination where standards of proof are
applied).
191. See, e.g., supra notes 119-20, 129, and 150 for statutes from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Indiana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, and Utah.
192. See, e.g., supra note 151 for statutes from Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, and
Oklahoma.
193. See, e.g., supra the statutes cited in notes 150-52.
194. There is some language in cases that would imply that, despite the instruction to determine if aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, jurors are free to impose life or death at will. This seems
counterintuitive when the instruction specifically tells the factfinder the question it must answer. It may be a
stronger argument in those states where the factfinder is told that, regardless of the finding, it may impose life.
The variations, however, do not change the need for a standard of proof where the factfinder is told that death
cannot be imposed unless the requisite finding is made. See supra notes 150-53 for discussion of statutory
language.
If the factfinder's decision was truly open-ended, then perhaps there would be no need for a standard of proof.
An open-ended procedure would simply give all the facts to the factfinder and instruct it to render a decision of
life or death based on the factfinder's own reasoning. This may be procedure in Georgia, which does not utilize a
"'weighing" process. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983). However, even then, the sentencer is decid-
ing that death is appropriate and that decision should be rendered with a particular degree of certainty.
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The Court addressed the risk of error and the symbolic effect of a standard of
proof.19 5 The classic risk of error analysis in a criminal case is comparing the
"social disutility" of convicting an innocent person with acquitting a guilty
one.196 In a capital penalty phase, the risk of error would be between imposing
an arbitrary or disproportionate death sentence and imposing an arbitrary or
disproportionate life imprisonment sentence.197 The symbolic effect is embodied
in the need for certainty in order to give moral force to the decision. The ques-
tion becomes whether society has confidence in the criminal justice system to
impose death nonarbitrarily without a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Al-
though overlapping in many respects, each aspect, risk of error and symbolic
effect, will be addressed.
The risk of an arbitrary life sentence is of minimal social disutility com-
pared with the risk of an arbitrary death sentence. Unlike the risk of acquitting
a guilty person, where society could be harmed by a dangerous person walking
the streets, the risk of an inappropriate life sentence still incarcerates a defend-
ant adjudged a danger to society. Similar to the great personal risk to an inno-
cent defendant who is found guilty, the personal risk to a defendant unjustly
sentenced to death is monumental. Moreover, the risk to a defendant unfairly
sentenced to death is extraordinarily more severe than to an innocent defendant
who is convicted since an executed death sentence is not reversible. Thus, the
balance of risks would soundly place the penalty decision in the category of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" decisions, such as those in the guilt phase of a
criminal trial.
The reasoning of the Court's decisions heightening the standard to "clear
and convincing" also supports a heightened standard in the penalty phase of a
capital case. Conversely, the penalty phase is distinguishable from those deci-
sions where the Court has found a "preponderance" standard sufficient. Cer-
tainly the loss of one's life is as highly valued as the loss of parental rights or
loss of liberty due to an involuntary civil commitment where the Court has
found a heightened standard necessary to satisfy due process. 1 8 Moreover, the
loss of one's life is significantly more important than the issues where the Court
has found a preponderance satisfied due process. A paternity action does not pit
an individual against the state as does a capital sentencing, and further results
only in a monetary obligation, not a loss of life. 99 The admissibility of evidence
is peripheral to the major issues in a case, whether civil or criminal, unlike a
death sentence which is treated as the final issue in a trial-type proceeding. 20' In
195. See supra text accompanying notes 88-100.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91 for a discussion of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Winship.
197. There is, of course, also the risk of executing an innocent person, an error that cannot be remedied. For
a discussion of the extent of the risk of executing an innocent person and a discussion of the inadequacies of
current death penalty schemes to minimize the risk, see point and counterpoint articles: Bedau and Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); Markman and Cassell, Protect-
ing the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988); Bedau and Radelet, The
Myth of Infallibility. A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1988).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
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addition, a sentence of death or life is distinguishable from a mandatory sen-
tence for carrying a visible firearm, which merely results in a longer term of
years, not a qualitatively different penalty such as death.20 1 The significance of
the risk to the criminal defendant in a capital penalty phase is staggering com-
pared with the risks involved in the other issues where the court has found pre-
ponderance sufficient. A life or death decision is more similar, and even more
severe, than the finality of a parental termination decision and the loss of liberty
in a civil commitment.
The risk of error analysis overlaps with, but should not underestimate, the
value of a high standard of proof as a symbol of the confidence of society in the
decision. In Winship, the Court spoke of the need for a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to ensure the "moral force" of criminal law.202 The same solem-
nity that attaches to the decision of guilt or innocence should apply to a decision
whether a defendant lives or dies. The Court has repeatedly expressed its view
that the death penalty decision is different and requires the utmost reliability.203
As the Court stated in a case reaffirming the principle that all mitigating evi-
dence must be considered, regardless whether the jurors were unanimous in
finding a particular mitigating circumstance:204
The decision to exercise the power of the State to execute a defendant is unlike any
other decision citizens and public officials are called upon to make. Evolving standards
of societal decency have imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on
the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case.206
The nature of the decision itself, life or death, thus speaks forcefully for using a
heightened standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.206
The death penalty is unique. No decision has such finality. A due process
analysis, based on the Court's cases on standards of proof, provides a compel-
ling argument for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Such a heightened
standard would reduce the risk of erroneous death verdicts and serve the sym-
bolic role of representing society's concern for a just sentence.
Thus, despite the probable failure of an eighth amendment rationale to
compel a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the penalty phase, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides a viable, independent the-
201. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
202. See supra text accompanying note 93.
203. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976), and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted), where Justice O'Connor stated:
Under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty has been treated differently from all other punishments.
• . . Among the most important and consistent themes in this Court's death penalty jurisprudence is the
need for special care and deliberation in decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction.
204. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988). Although the quoted language is stated in the context
of an eighth amendment issue, the principle that death is different is also strong support for a standard of proof
that reflects society's concern for accuracy in a due process sense. See Note, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha:
Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for Weighing Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AMER. CR. L.
REV. 63, 86 (1982) (nature of penalty calls for greater reliability under eighth and due process concepts).
205. Mills, 486 U.S. at 383-84.
206. See Note, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sentenc-
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 367-71 (1984) (author argues for beyond a reasonable doubt standard based on the theory
there should be a "presumption of life" in the penalty phase). See also, Weisberg, supra note 14 at 342 n.160
(comments on due process and eighth amendment theories for a beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
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ory. Although many of the procedural protections in the penalty phase are
based on the eighth amendment, the purpose of each amendment is unique. The
eighth amendment assures a nonarbitrary sentence. 20 7 The due process clause
assures fairness in the proceedings. 20 8 Due process fairness requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial.20 9 The Court has repeatedly analo-
gized the penalty phase of a capital case to a trial.210 Consequently, due process
should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the penalty phase where the
magnitude of the defendant's interest rivals or surpasses the defendant's interest
at trial.
VII. CONCLUSION
The death penalty is far from being abolished in this country. There is
constant litigation from every corner in capital cases and as a result, we now
have a wealth of Supreme Court opinions from the last eighteen years. The
Court's opinions on the death penalty have developed our knowledge of eighth
amendment jurisprudence. It is now time to resurrect the full scope of four-
teenth amendment due process rights that should apply in the penalty phase of
capital cases. With the proliferation of cases and impending executions, it is
especially time now to require that, if death is to be imposed, the sentencer be
certain of that decision. Moreover, the certainty of a decision of death should be
no less than the highest degree in our legal system, beyond a reasonable doubt.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
208. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359-64 (1970).
209. Id.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 182-88.
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